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I. INTRODUCTION 
The year was 1978.  Jimmy Carter was president.  Rudy Perpich 
was Minnesota’s governor.  A gallon of gas cost about sixty-three 
cents.  Disco was at its height and the Bee Gees were at the top of 
the popular music charts.  That year, Minnesota’s legislature 
created the Sentencing Guidelines Commission.  Two years later, 
the new Guidelines began to control adult sentencing decisions 
made by judges in Minnesota’s state courts.1   
The new Guidelines replaced a parole system which was highly 
discretionary: a robber, for example, might be sentenced to “0–20 
years,” but actually serve three years, based on the Minnesota 
Corrections Board’s review of his case2 and his conduct in prison.3  
 
 1. See generally William E. Falvey, Defense Perspectives on the Minnesota Sentencing 
Guidelines, 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 257 (1982) (discussing how the Guidelines affect 
defense attorneys and their ability to act on behalf of their clients); Stephen C. 
Rathke, Plea Negotiating Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 271 
(1982) (explaining how the Guidelines give prosecutors greater power in 
negotiating plea agreements).  Academics have generally admired the Guidelines 
as well.  See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Implementing Commission-Based Sentencing 
Guidelines: The Lessons of the First Ten Years in Minnesota, 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
279 (1993) (explaining the goals that have been achieved by the Guidelines). 
 2. As a convenience, male personal pronouns are used to describe offenders 
in this Article.  In fact, as of July 1, 2010, 6.5% of offenders in Minnesota prisons 
2
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Under the new Guidelines, proponents claimed things would be 
different—prison sentences were to be set forth in a matrix filled 
with precise numbers of months.  The matrix was designed to 
improve sentences in several ways: 
• Create sentences proportional to the offender’s 
culpability and the crime; 
• Eliminate or greatly reduce disparities;  
• Be “rational and consistent”; and 
• Be economical: treat prison beds as a scarce resource and 
work within the state’s existing capacity.4 
Under the new Guidelines, some hard-to-measure purposes of 
sentencing—like rehabilitation and incapacitation—were to drop 
out of the picture in favor of clear, carefully measured “just 
deserts.”5  The Sentencing Guidelines Commission was supposed to 
produce these results by taking on a permanent role as an 
independent sentencing policymaker working outside the political 
turbulence of the state legislature.6 
Thirty years of experience demonstrates that the claims made 
by the proponents of the Guidelines have gone unrealized.  All 
three branches of government have asserted control over felony 
sentencing.  Disparity and disproportionality have flourished, 
especially in the politically charged arenas of drug and sex-crime 
sentencing.  The role of the Sentencing Guidelines Commission 
has been to make minor adjustments, as the prison population 
increased fivefold over the last three decades due to big sentencing 
policy decisions made by elected officials.7  Racial demographics in 
 
are women.  MINN. DEP'T OF CORR., ADULT INMATE PROFILE AS OF 07/01/2010, at 1 
(2010), available at http://www.doc.state.mn.us/aboutdoc/stats/documents
/07-10AdultProfile.pdf. 
 3. See Rathke, supra note 1, at 272–76. 
 4. Project, Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines and Commentary, 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 
395, 395–96 (1982). 
 5. Audrey LeSuer, Introduction to the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, 5 
HAMLINE L. REV. 293, 297 (1982).  The “just deserts” model asserts that the sole 
motive for incarcerating an individual should be for punishment.  Id.  In this 
retribution-based model, “the severity of the sentence should depend on the 
seriousness of the defendant’s crime or crimes—on what he did, rather than on 
what the sentencer expects he will do if treated in a certain fashion.”  Id. (quoting 
REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, 
FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 16 (1976)). 
 6. See Andrew von Hirsch, Constructing Guidelines for Sentencing: The Critical 
Choices for the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 164, 
171–76 (1982). 
 7. See infra Parts II–IV; see also Frase, supra note 1, at n.4 (showing the 1980 
3
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the prisons have swung wildly depending on the ethnic 
composition of the group using the most popular recreational 
drugs.8  The advocates of both rehabilitation and incapacitation 
have made their own changes, through departures—upward and 
downward—from the presumed sentences, and by establishing add-
ons like the rehabilitative Drug Courts and the incapacitative sex 
offender commitment “hospitals.”9 
Along the way a new idea has emerged: that sentencing can be 
effective as an “evidence-based practice.”10  This line of thinking was 
left out of the Guidelines.  The originators of the Guidelines were 
scornful of the belief that prison could serve any useful function 
other than housing those receiving carefully measured 
punishment.  As use of the Guidelines evolved, it became apparent 
that their sentencing numbers were not really based on anything.  
What is the true “just desert” of someone who possesses half an 
ounce of cocaine?  Should it be probation?  Twelve months in 
prison?  Eighty-six months—as it is now—in the post “War on 
Drugs” era?  Nobody knows.  Are we getting our money’s worth—at 
about $35,000 a year to incarcerate each inmate11—or would the 
use of a Drug Court or Challenge Incarceration Program give 
better results at a lower cost?  These are the questions that need 
answers.  Suddenly it does not appear possible to spend unlimited 
funds locking people up based on large numbers on a grid written 
by politicians.  Elected officials always feel pressure to pick the 
highest sentences in order to appear “tough on crime.” 
Despite their flaws, the Guidelines could still play a useful role 
if the political branches of government would back off and allow an 
independent sentencing policy group to return to the original goal 
 
prison population at 2000 inmates compared to the current population at just 
under 10,000). 
 8. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, UPDATED REPORT ON DRUG 
OFFENDER SENTENCING ISSUES 1, 8–10, (2007) [hereinafter UPDATED REPORT], 
available at http://sentencing.nj.gov/downloads/pdf/articles/2007/May2007
/document02.pdf  (documenting racial demographic changes correlated with use 
of specific drugs). 
 9. See infra text accompanying notes 79–128. 
 10. See infra Part V. 
 11. See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, 1 IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN 
CORRECTIONS FACT SHEETS 24 (2009) [hereinafter THE LONG REACH FACT SHEETS] 
(showing 2008 Minnesota prison cost to be $89.77 per inmate per day), available at 
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewcenteronthestatesorg
/Fact_Sheets/PSPP_1in31_factsheets_FINAL_WEB.pdf.  The cited figure is the 
operational per diem, which is less than the per diem of $112.38 calculated 
pursuant to Minnesota Statutes, section 241.018.  MINN. STAT. § 241.018 (2010). 
4
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of proportional, economical sentencing.  The next time there is a 
redesign of Minnesota’s sentencing system, the decisions should be 
based on evidence of correctional strategies proven to work.  Today 
there is evidence to be found and people who know how to find it. 
II. SEX OFFENDERS UNDER THE GUIDELINES: THE ILLUSION 
OF “JUST DESERTS” AND THE ELUSIVENESS OF 
PROPORTIONALITY 
A. Sex Offenders and Their Sentences—1980 
The main felony sex offenses in Minnesota are classified using 
four degrees, defined in Minnesota Statutes, sections 609.342, .343, 
.344, and .345.12  First- and third-degree offenses are sexual 
penetration crimes while second- and fourth-degree offenses each 
require sexual contact.13  The statutes contemplate a spectrum of 
increasing culpability from fourth degree up to first degree.14  But 
the Sentencing Guidelines process has been unable to provide a 
satisfactory “just desert” sentence for first-degree criminal sexual 
conduct or appropriate gradations for sex crimes that fall along the 
spectrum.  The Guidelines also failed to keep sex crime sentences 
proportional to the presumed sentences for other violent crimes. 
Third-degree criminal sexual conduct is a good starting point 
for the illustration of these problems.  This crime requires sexual 
penetration achieved by “force or coercion.”15  This is the common 
law crime of forcible rape, with first-degree criminal sexual conduct 
being aggravated forcible rape, including among its elements use 
of a weapon, or “personal injury to the complainant.”16   
In the original Sentencing Guidelines, the presumed sentences 
for both first- and third-degree crimes, if committed by a person 
with no criminal history, were executed commitments to state 
prison.  First degree was to be punished by forty-three months of 
incarceration, the same as assault in the first degree (great bodily 
harm), kidnapping with great bodily harm, and manslaughter in 
the first degree.17  The third-degree sentence would be twenty-four 
months in prison, the same as the presumed sentence for 
 
 12. See MINN. STAT. §§ 609.342–.345 (2008). 
 13. Id. 
 14. See id. 
 15. Id. § 609.344, subdiv. 1(c) (2008). 
 16. Id. § 609.342, subdiv. 1(d)–(e) (2008). 
 17. See Project, supra note 4, at 428–29. 
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aggravated robbery and arson in the first degree.18 
Consistency and rationality were central purposes of the 
Sentencing Guidelines.19  Yet these goals are unattainable when 
uncertainty blurs the definition of a crime’s elements.  Criminal 
sexual conduct, for example, is interpreted by case law as having 
overlapping definitions of its first and third degrees.20  The 
“personal injury” necessary to establish the first-degree crime can 
be the pain that accompanies sexual penetration by force.21  
“Force” is also an element of the third-degree definition.22  
Therefore, any third-degree force case can be charged as a first-
degree injury.  The result is that some offenders who did exactly the 
same thing walk away with very different sentences.23  The supreme 
court created a similar problem in the property crime area by 
holding that theft and receiving stolen property were the same 
offense.24  
Pre-Guidelines, when the Minnesota Corrections Board sorted 
out offenders who had received indeterminate sentences (“0–10 
years” or “0–20 years,” for example), definitional distinctions of this 
sort were not too consequential.  However, when the Sentencing 
Guidelines began to grade crimes by culpability, loose charges and 
degree definitions inevitably resulted in inconsistent and irrational 
outcomes. 
Problems with consistency and rationality cropped up in other 
areas as well.  Criminal sexual conduct sentences for first time 
offenders were quite different depending upon the degree 
charged: forty-three months incarceration for first degree, twenty-
one or twenty-four for second degree.25  The appellate courts ruled 
that slight penetration was sufficient to establish first degree, a 
definition that was later codified.26  The second-degree offense is 
 
 18. See id. 
 19. See id. at 395. 
 20. See John Stuart & Richard Trachy, The Guidelines v. the Code: Do Crimes Fit 
Their Punishments?, BENCH & B. MINN., Apr. 1987, at 14–15. 
 21. See State v. Reinke, 343 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Minn. 1984); State v. Bowser, 
307 N.W.2d 778, 779 (Minn. 1981). 
 22. See MINN. STAT. § 609.344 (2010). 
 23. See Project, supra note 4, at 428–29. 
 24. See State v. Lawrence, 312 N.W.2d 251, 252 (Minn. 1981). 
 25. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, 38–
39 (1980), available at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/guidelines/1980_report_to
_the_leg.pdf. 
 26. See MINN. STAT. § 609.341 (2008) (defining penetration as “intrusion 
however slight”); State v. Mosby, 450 N.W.2d 629, 635 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); State 
6
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defined as a crime of “contact.”27  Factually, the difference can be 
tiny.  But the definitions were crafted to provide rough drafts of 
sentences that would be finalized through the parole process after 
corrections workers got to know the offender.28  No longer do the 
definitions provide a rough draft.  Now, in the Guidelines era, they 
control precise and very different punishments for culpability levels 
that are very close or indistinguishable.  The finding of slight 
penetration rather than touching—potentially a very small 
behavioral variation—after 1980 resulted in a Guidelines-mandated 
sentence almost twice as severe.  The result of marrying the 
Criminal Code with the Guidelines was to take the power that had 
resided in the Minnesota Corrections Board and give it to eighty-
seven elected county attorneys to exercise through plea 
bargaining.29 
B. Sex Offenders and Their Sentences—1988 to the Present 
As time went by, public and legislative responses to some 
terrifying, horrible crimes led to drastic increases in the penalties 
for criminal sexual conduct.  The increases raise questions about 
proportionality.  In 1988, Carrie Coonrod and Mary Foley were 
raped and killed by sex offenders.30  These crimes led to the 1989 
legislature doubling sex offenders’ prison sentences.  This 
legislative intervention into the Guidelines development process 
was at least proportional, because other violent crime sentences 
were also doubled.31  In 2000, after the disappearance of a young 
 
v. Shamp, 422 N.W.2d 520, 526 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).  Similarly, knocking out a 
victim’s tooth is an assault in the first degree because it involves the loss of a 
“bodily member.”  State v. Bridgeforth, 357 N.W.2d 393, 394 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1984). 
 27. MINN. STAT. § 609.343 (2008). 
 28. For example, there was no need for the supreme court to consider the 
cost of its decision in 1967 that any injury to a robbery victim would elevate the 
offense from “simple” to “aggravated” robbery because, at that time, both had 
indeterminate sentences.  See State v. Johnson, 277 Minn. 230, 232–33, 152 N.W.2d 
768, 770–71 (1967). 
 29. See generally Rathke, supra note 1. 
 30. See Dan Gunderson, Critics Charge Sex Offender Screening Tool Doesn’t Work, 
MINN. PUB. RADIO, Apr. 19, 2004, available at http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org
/features/2004/04/19_gundersond_mnsostr/.  From an “avoidance of disparity” 
viewpoint, however, it is disconcerting to see the actual punishment for the same 
crime double overnight, so that a first degree offense committed on August 1 
would receive eighty-six months rather than the forty-three months, which was the 
presumed sentence the day before. 
 31. See 1989 Minn. Laws 1594–95.  The 1989 legislature, in the same bill, 
7
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woman named Katie Poirer, the legislature reached into the first 
degree, first offender box on the grid and raised the presumed 
sentence from 86 to 144 months.32 
Of course, the legislature has a duty to be concerned about 
violent sex crimes.  But the history of sex crime sentencing raises 
important questions.  First, what is the “just desert” for this offense?  
Is it forty-three months?  Eighty-six months?  One hundred forty-
four months?  Second, who should say what the “just deserts” are 
for these crimes?  The independent, policy-making Sentencing 
Guidelines Commission (who designed the system in the first 
place) or elected officials?  Third, how can the sentencing grid 
maintain the proportionality which is the intended source of its 
integrity and usefulness? 
Originally, the sentence length ratio of first-degree criminal 
sexual conduct to aggravated robbery with no criminal history was 
43:24 months.33  In 1989, the relationship was maintained at 86:48 
months.34  Call it “not quite double,” for purposes of discussion.  
With the change to 144 months, however, the ratio is now 144:48.35  
To put it another way, “triple.”  Is first-degree criminal sexual 
conduct almost twice as severe a crime as aggravated robbery or 
three times as severe?  Similarly, first-degree criminal sexual 
conduct—at 86 months—had the same presumed sentence as 
manslaughter in the first degree; now there is a ratio of 144:86.36  
Though proportionality remains a goal of the Guidelines, it seems 
that no one is keeping watch over the relative severity of the 
behaviors that lead to these criminal charges. 
The same kind of question can be asked about the presumed 
sentences for other degrees of criminal sexual conduct.  Third 
degree is at the same level as aggravated robbery—forty-eight 
 
created an add-on sex offender departure provision called “patterned sex 
offenders,” now Minnesota Statutes, section 609.1352—an indication that in this 
area the Guidelines's criminal history scoring system was considered inadequate 
for incapacitation.  Id. 
 32. See 2000 Minn. Laws 311.  Donald Blom was convicted of the Poirer 
murder.  Blom Gets Life Without Parole for Kidnapping and Killing Poirier, MINNESOTA 
PUBLIC RADIO, Aug. 17, 2000, available at http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org
/features/200008/17_newsroom_blom/. 
 33. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, SENTENCING GUIDELINES GRID 
(1981), available at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/guidelines/grids/grid_1981.pdf. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See id. (categorizing manslaughter as a level IX offense on the Offense 
Severity Reference Table). 
8
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months presumed, with no criminal history.37  However, the courts 
continue to hold that a very slight injury to the victim is sufficient 
to elevate the offense to the higher degree.  Under the Guidelines, 
if the victim of forcible sexual penetration receives a bruise or 
suffers “redness or soreness” after the offense, the perpetrator gets 
144 months, three times the third-degree sentence.38  Behavioral 
variation between first and third degree can be slight, yet the 
sentence can be tripled. 
No one has much sympathy for criminal sexual conduct 
offenders, yet just about anyone can recognize a disturbing 
randomness in the history of the development of these sentences.  
The best explanation seems to be that policy-makers, contrary to 
the designs of the originators of the Guidelines, are slowly finding 
their way toward a plan to incapacitate these individuals.  In the 
thirty years since the Guidelines went into effect, there have been 
sex offender enhancements created in almost every session of the 
legislature.  For example: 
• Dangerous sex offenders sentencing;39 
• Criminal sexual predatory conduct;40 
• Predatory offender registration;41 
• Community notification;42 
• Expansion of the civil commitment program, and 
enormous growth of the sex offender secure treatment 
program;43 
 
 37.  See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N,  SENTENCING GUIDELINES GRID 
(2010), available at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/guidelines/grids/grid_2010.pdf 
(excluding several types of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, which carry only 
a thirty-six month sentence). 
 38. See State v. Mattson, 376 N.W.2d 413, 414 (Minn. 1985) (affirming a 
conviction of second degree criminal sexual conduct based on evidence of bruising 
and soreness); State v. Stufflebean, 329 N.W.2d 314, 316 (Minn. 1983) (affirming a 
conviction of fourth degree criminal sexual conduct due to evidence of victim’s 
“soreness and redness”); State v. Bowser, 307 N.W.2d 778, 779 (Minn. 1981) 
(affirming a conviction of first degree criminal sexual conduct because there was 
evidence of penetration and “either . . . pain or . . . minimal injury”).  
 39. See MINN. STAT. § 609.3455 (2005). 
 40. See id. § 609.345 (2005). 
 41. See id. § 243.166 (1991). 
 42. See id. § 244.052 (1996). 
 43. See generally id. § 609.1351 (1989); MINNESOTA SEX OFFENDER PROGRAM 
ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT 3, available at http://archive.leg.state.mn.us
/docs/2010/mandated/100475.pdf (adding 400 beds in July 2009).  See also Paul 
Demko, MN Sex Offender Program Costs $70 Million a Year but Rehabilitates No One, 
MINN. INDEP. (Nov. 13, 2010, 9:39 AM), http://minnesotaindependent.com
9
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• Engrained sex offenders;44 
• Egregious sex offenders;45 
• Separate grid for sex offenders.46 
A search of the Minnesota Revisor of Statutes webpage47 reveals 
that in the 2010 legislative session, twenty-four sex offender bills 
relating to sexual offenses were introduced in the senate;48 thirty-six 
in the senate.49  Although a new sex offender sentencing grid 
designed by Governor Tim Pawlenty’s Commission on Sex 
Offenders had just taken effect August 1, 2006, the governor 
proposed, and a bill was introduced, to further increase the 
presumed sentence for first-degree criminal sexual conduct from 
144 months to 300 months.50  If enacted, the first-degree sentence 
would have been over six times the sentence for aggravated 
robbery.51  Even more perplexing, it would have been over six times 






 44. MINN. STAT. § 609.345, subdiv. 3(a) (2006). 
 45. Id. § 609.345, subdiv. 3 (2005). 
 46. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, SEX OFFENDER GRID (2006), 
available at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/guidelines/grids/grid_2006_sex.doc. 
 47. The search results from the Revisor website are not official and are meant 
for illustrative purposes only. 
 48. Bills Introduced in the 2009–10 Minnesota Senate Relating to Sexual 




visited Oct. 28, 2010). 
 49. Bills Introduced in the 2009–10 Minnesota House Relating to Sexual 




visited Oct. 28, 2010). 
 50. H.F. 3081 § 1, 2010 Leg., 86th Sess. (Minn. 2010). 
 51. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, SENTENCING GUIDELINES GRID 
(2009), available at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/guidelines/grids/grid_2009.pdf 
(showing a sentence of forty-eight months for such offenders with a criminal 
history score of zero). 
 52. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, SEX OFFENDER GRID (2009), 
available at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/guidelines/grids/grid_2009_sex.pdf 
(showing a sentence of thirty-six or forty-eight months for such offenders with a 
criminal history score of zero). 
10
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It appears that policymakers have lost confidence in the ability 
of the Guidelines process to provide as much incapacitation as they 
feel is needed.  Meanwhile, individuals are receiving very long 
sentences under the Guidelines without the Minnesota Corrections 
Board reevaluating these individuals and their cases.  Some of the 
first-degree offenders might be just a little bit more culpable than a 
third-degree offender, and some of the third-degree offenders 
might be just as culpable as a first-degree offender, but the 
corrections officials who know these individuals have no power to 
change their sentences. 
III. DRUGS AND DISPARITIES: THE GUIDELINES’ DESPERATE 
VOYAGE THROUGH THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE IN EIGHTY-
SEVEN COUNTIES 
The recent history of sex offender sentencing in Minnesota 
shows that the development of the Guidelines in the context of the 
state’s criminal justice politics has been a very rough process.  The 
concept of “just deserts” underlying the Guidelines turned out to 
be a political construct lacking a strong enough foundation to 
withstand legislative intervention based on the kinds of actual 
tragic and violent sex crimes that are known to occur.53  High hopes 
for a sentencing system based on retribution ran into the reality of 
horrible crimes for which no retribution would be enough.54  The 
“economy” value present in the original Guidelines did not 
survive.55  The role of the Commission as independent 
policymakers, crucial to the whole enterprise,56 was greatly limited 
by a 1984 amendment to the statute requiring Guidelines changes 
to be approved by the legislature.57  Proportionality, one of the 
greatest virtues of the Guidelines, suffered greatly in the area of sex 
offenses: there are huge differences in the punishments for very 
similar or identical acts distinguished only by legally established 
“degrees.”58  Further disparities resulted as practitioners used 
varying enhancements, amply provided by legislation, to try to 
 
 53. See supra text accompanying notes 19–23. 
 54. For an example of such a horrible crime, see State v. Stewart, 514 N.W.2d 
559 (Minn. 1994). 
 55. Von Hirsch, supra note 6, at 177. 
 56. Id. at 170 (emphasizing the Minnesota Sentencing Guideline 
Commission’s understanding that its role was to shape sentencing policy). 
 57.  1984 Minn. Laws 1236–37 (amending Minnesota Statutes, section 244.09 
to require legislative approval of changes made to the sentencing guidelines). 
 58. See supra text accompanying notes 12–15. 
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incapacitate sex offenders.59  But at least these varying results for 
sex offenders served one of the main policy goals of the 
Guidelines—the use of prisons as a response to violent crimes.60   
In contrast, the development of drug sentencing in Minnesota 
since the inception of the Guidelines shows an indulgence in over-
punishment, a disregard for proportionality, and a high tolerance 
for disparity—based mostly on where the offender happens to live.61  
None of these three indulgences are grounded in the desire to 
incapacitate perpetrators of violent acts.62  Elected officials 
responded to public hysteria about drugs by pushing the 
Guidelines sentences higher and higher.  Practitioners who daily 
handled the actual cases in court responded by more or less 
discarding the Guidelines—more so in the Metro area, less so in 
Greater Minnesota.63 
A. Drug Offenses and Their Sentences—1980 Through the “War on 
Drugs” Years 
When the Guidelines first took effect in 1980, all felony drug 
convictions for first-time offenders carried only a presumptive 
probationary sentence.  These individuals could expect an 
executed term of incarceration only where aggravating 
circumstances were present.64  After all, these were not violent 
crimes.  In the 1980s, however, the “War on Drugs” ideology swept 
through America, tripling drug arrests and disproportionately 







 59. See supra text accompanying note 26. 
 60. Kay A. Knapp, Impact of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines on Sentencing 
Practices, 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 237, 239–40 (1982). 
 61. See infra Part III.C. 
 62. See supra text accompanying notes 56–58; infra notes 74–82. 
 63. See infra Parts III.C. & D. 
 64. Scott G. Swanson, Minnesota’s Controlled Substance Law: A History, BENCH & 
B. MINN., Dec. 1999, at 23, available at http://www2.mnbar.org/benchandbar
/1999/dec99/drugs.htm. 
 65. See MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, A 25-YEAR 
QUAGMIRE: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN SOCIETY 2 (2007), available 
at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/dp_25yearquagmire.pdf. 
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 14
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss2/14
 
438 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:2 
In Minnesota, these trends overwhelmed previous versions of 
the Guidelines.66  One author traced the increase of drug sentences 
for a hypothetical offender guilty of possession of cocaine.67  
Between 1980 and 1999, the hypothetical offender’s sentence grew 
from probation, with a year and a day stayed, to an executed 
sentence of 158 months in prison.68  This was forty-two months 
more than the presumed sentence for second-degree murder in 
the original Sentencing Guidelines.69 
B. The Commission’s Attempts to Reestablish Proportionality 
To their credit, the 2003 and 2006 legislatures directed the 
Guidelines Commission to prepare reports on drug offender 
sentences.70  They were concerned that felony drug offenders rose 
from 801 in 1981 to 3425 in 2002, and that this group had gone 
from 9% of the prison population to 23% in twelve years.71  The 
“new prison commit” drug cases were even higher, up to 30.1% by 
2002.72  Moreover, the average prison sentence for a drug crime 
nearly doubled from 1988 to 2005.73  Disproportionality was obvious 
in at least two respects: possession of twenty-five grams of cocaine 
had been put at the same level as first-degree manslaughter (eighty-
six months for a first offense); and first offense presumed sentences 
for drug crimes had actually been set higher than the mandatory 
 
 66. Swanson, supra note 64.  For the effect on communities of color, see 
Thomas L. Johnson & Cheryl Widder Heilman, Racial Disparity in the Criminal 
Justice System, BENCH & B. MINN., May–June 2001, at 29.  At the time of the Johnson 
& Heilman article, Minnesota had developed “the largest disparity between black 
and white imprisonment rates of any state in the nation.”  Id.; see also MINN. SUP. 
CT. TASK FORCE ON RACIAL BIAS IN THE JUD. SYS., FINAL REPORT 49–57 (1993) (“In 
Minnesota the number of arrests of African Americans for narcotics crimes rose 
500% between 1981 and 1990, almost 17 times as fast as the rise in arrests of 
whites.  By way of comparison, the African American population grew by 78% in 
that same period.”). 
 67. Swanson, supra note 64 (using as the hypothetical offender a person guilty 
of possessing a half ounce of cocaine with a street value of $1200; explaining that 
“intent to sell” was presumed). 
 68. Id. 
 69. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, SENTENCING GUIDELINES GRID 
(1981), available at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/guidelines/grids/grid_1981.pdf. 
 70. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ON 
DRUG OFFENDER SENTENCING ISSUES (2004) [hereinafter REPORT], available at 
http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/council/2004-meetings/20040227/docs/06
_leg2004drug.pdf; UPDATED REPORT, supra note 8.  
 71. Id. at 1. 
 72. Id. at 3. 
 73. UPDATED REPORT, supra note 8, at 3. 
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minimums for repeat controlled substance offenders.74  The first 
report in 2004 suggested that the threshold weights could be made 
higher—Minnesota’s “first degree” crimes are based on much 
lower weights than comparable states—or, in the alternative, drug 
crimes could be re-ranked at a less serious level.75 
Neither of these things happened.  In 2007, the Commission 
presented an “Updated Report,” explicitly recommending that the 
sentences for first-degree and second-degree drug crimes be moved 
down one level, so that the presumed first offense sentence for first 
degree would be forty-eight months in prison, not eighty-six.76  The 
Commission could have made this change itself and it would have 
gone into effect unless explicitly rejected by the legislature.77  In 
fact, the 2007 legislature, in a rider to the Commission’s 
appropriation, had directed that “[t]he commission shall propose 
changed rankings for controlled substance offenses on the 
sentencing guidelines grid [taking into account] . . . 
proportionality[,] . . . [other states’ and federal sentences,] . . . 
and . . . cost . . . .”78 
The stage appeared to be set for change.  However, as the year 
went by and the Commission continued to discuss the issue, 
powerful resistance appeared.79  The Chair of the Commission, 
Olmsted County Sheriff Steven Borchardt, indicated to the group 
that his constituency “would not support lowering controlled 
substance in the first-degree and second-degree by one severity 
level each. . . . [T]hat was a job for the legislature.”80  A compromise 
emerged that would lower the levels for the possession offenses in 
 
 74. Id.  Note that “intent to sell” is no longer required to receive this sentence.  
Sentence levels for 2005 are set forth in MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES GRID (2005), available at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us
/guidelines/grids/grid_2005.doc. 
 75. REPORT, supra note 70, at 1–2.   For specific state comparisons, see id. at 
48–51.  The Minnesota Supreme Court exacerbated the “drug weight threshold” 
problem when it ruled that liquid in a water pipe used to smoke drugs counts as 
part of the drug weight.  See State v. Peck, 773 N.W.2d 768 (Minn. 2009). 
 76. UPDATED REPORT, supra note 8, at 2–3, 20.  
 77. MINN. STAT. § 244.09, subdiv. 11 (2008); see also MINN. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES COMM’N, APPROVED MEETING MINUTES 3 (Feb. 15, 2007), available at 
http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/msgc5/meetings.htm#2007.  
 78. 2007 Minn. Laws 226–27.   
 79. See, e.g., MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, APPROVED MEETING 
MINUTES 3 (Aug. 16, 2007), available at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/msgc5
/meetings.htm#2007. 
 80. Id. 
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the first- and second-degree statutes.81  It would not lower sentences 
for sales offenses and would create new aggravating factors to 
produce higher sentences in certain situations.82  
In the fall of 2007, there was more resistance.83  The Minnesota 
County Attorneys Association issued a lengthy position paper 
opposing the Commission’s compromise re-ranking proposal.84  
Their leading claim was that drug possessors actually are violent 
criminals because they are “associated with . . . gang activity” or 
might commit other violent crimes to get money for drugs.85  A 
more substantial issue emerges toward the end of their document: 
by taking some drug offenders out of state prison and putting them 
on probation—funded locally in many parts of the state—a cost 
shift from state to county funding would occur.86  Rather than 
argue for a fund transfer, the county attorneys opposed the whole 
concept.87 
Then the Minnesota County Attorneys Association joined with 
the Minnesota Chiefs of Police Association, the Minnesota Sheriffs 
Association, and the Minnesota Police and Peace Officers 
Association to form a new group they named the “Minnesota Law 
Enforcement Coalition.”88  This group also asserted that drug 
possessors were “violent” so that re-ranking of the possession crimes 
would be inappropriate; plus, it might transfer a cost from the state 
to the counties.89   
Finally, the day before the Commission was scheduled to vote 
on whether to submit its compromise “possession crimes” re-
ranking proposal to the legislature, the members got a letter from 
 
 81. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO 
THE MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY: RE-RANKING 1ST AND 2ND 
DEGREE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE POSSESSION CRIMES 1 (2007) (on file with author 
John Stuart).   
 82. Id.  
 83. See, e.g., MINN. CNTY. ATT'YS ASS’N, RESPONSE TO MINNESOTA SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES 2007 UPDATED REPORT ON DRUG OFFENDER SENTENCING ISSUES (2007).   
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 3. With this approach, the Guidelines depart from a “just deserts” 
philosophy by failing to make the punishment closely fit the crime.  Rather, they 
punish people not just for their actual bad acts, but for presumed ones as well.  
Due process of law fails when drug offenders have no day in court on the question 
of violence. 
 86. Id. at 11. 
 87. See id. at 12. 
 88. See Letter from Minn. Law Enforcement Coal. to Minn. Sentencing 
Guidelines Comm’n (Oct. 29, 2007) (on file with author John Stuart). 
 89. Id. 
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Governor Pawlenty.90  His position was that “the re-ranking 
proposal should not be enacted,” because drug offenders “must be 
held accountable.  Their oftentimes violent crimes endanger 
Minnesota residents . . . .”91   
The Governor’s position is irreconcilable with the “just 
deserts” foundation of the Guidelines in addition to being contrary 
to the intent of the legislature when it directed the Commission to 
submit a plan to re-rank these offenses.92  However, the 
Commission voted 7-3 not to submit its own compromise proposal 
after all.93  The conclusion is inescapable: the Commission gave up 
its independent policy-making voice in the area of drug 
sentencing.94 
The epilogue?  The 2008 legislature created a “Working Group 
on Controlled Substance Laws,” directed to consider nine 
questions that might lead to changes in the weight thresholds or 
offense rankings.95  The discussions were very contentious and did 
not lead to the enactment of any changes in the 2009 or 2010 
legislative sessions.96 
C. Sentencing Departures in Drug Cases: Practitioners Vote with Their 
Feet 
Meanwhile, practitioners in the courts were creating their own 
sentencing systems for drug offenders.  By the summer of 2010, a 
good argument could be made that the Guidelines were irrelevant 
to these cases because the presumed sentence was being 
administered in far fewer than half of the cases.97  For example, first 
 
 90. Letter from Tim Pawlenty, Governor, State of Minn., to Jeffrey Edblad, 
Chair of the Minn. Sentencing Guidelines Comm’n (Nov. 14, 2007) (on file with 
author John Stuart). 
 91. Id. 
 92. See generally MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, MEETING MINUTES 3 
(Nov. 15, 2007), available at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/meeting_minutes/2007
_minutes/2007_nov15_minutes.doc (stating that Justice Helen Meyer “did not 
think the Commission had the authority to ignore the state mandate, because the 
State legislature created the Commission”). 
 93. Id. at 4. 
 94. See id. at 3 (quoting Justice Meyer’s opinion that “the proposed 
modifications were simply to correct a problem that had been growing inside the 
guidelines for many years.”).  
 95. H.F. 2996 § 27, 2008 Leg., 85th Sess. (Minn. 2008). 
 96. One of the authors was a member of the Working Group, participated in 
its deliberations, and testified at the subsequent legislative hearings in the 2009 
Session. 
 97. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, SENTENCING GUIDELINES: DRUG 
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offenders’ mitigated dispositional departure rate—where a judge 
does not send an offender to prison who had a presumed sentence 
that did involve prison time—ranged through the ten judicial 
districts from a low of 30% to a high of 85%, with the four largest 
districts at 80%, 85%, 52%, and 71%.98  For offenders who actually 
were sentenced to prison and for whom the Guidelines required 
prison sentences, there were also mitigated durational 
departures—shorter sentences—in the four largest judicial districts 
as follows: 43%, 11%, 28%, and 35%.99  As a result, most drug 
offenders who were supposed to go to prison either did not go at 
all, or went for less time than they were intended to serve.  For 
example, only 20% of the Hennepin County first offenders who 
were meant to go to prison actually went.100  Of the offenders who 
did go, 43% got less than the Guidelines sentence.101 
 The Commission took note of this situation in its 2007 
Updated Report: 
 The striking number of downward durational and 
dispositional departures substantially lessens the impact of 
drug crimes on Minnesota’s prisons.  If the departure 
rates were lower, the Department of Corrections’ 
expenditures on drug offenders would be enormous. 
 The high mitigated departure rates suggest that 
criminal justice practitioners may believe presumptive 
drug sentences are too severe.  The departures may also 
suggest that Minnesota law does not adequately identify 
the most serious offenders and fails to distinguish between 
them and less culpable individuals.102 
 
DEPARTURES & REVOCATIONS BY RACE, at Mitigated Dispositional Departure Rates by Race 
and Criminal History (2010) (on file with author Robert Sykora).  Only three 
judicial districts impose the presumed commit sentence more than half the time, 
and these districts are relatively small compared to the First, Second, Fourth, and 
Tenth districts.  Id. at Type of Sentence Pronounced for Presumptive Commits by Judicial 
District (providing the total of dispositional and durational departures and also 
showing that only Districts Three, Seven, and Eight give drug offenders the 
presumed sentence more than half the time).  Note that this 2010 report is based 
on 2008 data. 
 98. Id. at Mitigated Dispositional Departure Rates by Race and Criminal History.  
The four districts include Hennepin, Ramsey, Anoka, and Dakota Counties, 
among others.   
 99. Id. at Mitigated Durational Departure Rates by Judicial District. 
 100. See id. at Mitigated Dispositional Departure Rates by Judicial District and 
Criminal History (showing data for all drug offenders). 
 101. See id. at Mitigated Durational Departure Rates by Judicial District. 
 102. UPDATED REPORT, supra note 8, at 14. 
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In short, the lawyers, probation officers, and judges who were 
handling actual drug cases in court had created their own de facto 
reforms of the controlled substance sentencing schemes that were 
established in law by the Guidelines. 
D. Drug Sentences and Justice-by-Geography 
This widespread subversion of the presumed sentence system 
in controlled substance cases might mitigate some of the 
proportionality and disparity issues noted previously.103  That is, 
many first-degree drug crime first offenders were not really getting 
the same sentence as a person convicted of manslaughter in the 
first degree.104  What was lost in the proliferation of mitigated 
departures, however, was statewide consistency in sentencing. 
Statewide consistency has been a concern from the beginning.  
The Commission’s Research Director, Kay Knapp, reported in 1982 
that the statewide dispositional departure rate was 6.2% of the 
Guidelines’ first 5500 cases.105  This was tolerable because the 
Commission felt that a rate of less than 10% dispositional 
departures would show that uniformity was increasing over that 
afforded by the previous parole system.106  The range among 
Minnesota’s ten judicial districts varied, however, from 1.9% in the 
Fifth District (Southwestern Minnesota) up to 10.2% in the Fourth 
District (Hennepin County).107  Durational departure rates—the 
lengths of prison sentences—showed the same pattern: overall, less 
than 10%, but with a big variance (3.8%–12.9%) among the 
judicial districts.108 
By 2004, it was obvious that the departure rates in drug cases 
were vastly higher than the 10% contemplated by the Commission 
in the early 1980s.  The geographical disparities also varied greatly 
from the study of the first sample.  From 1995 to 2002, the average 
dispositional departure rate for drug cases in Hennepin County was 
56%.109  For the drug offenders who were sent to prison, the 
average mitigated durational departure rate in Hennepin County 
 
 103. See supra Parts II and III.A. 
 104. See supra Part III. 
 105. Knapp, supra note 60, at 241–42. 
 106. See id. at 242. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 244. 
 109. See REPORT, supra note 70, at 41 fig.31 (dividing the sum of the data by the 
eight years measured). 
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during those years was 50.5%.110  Therefore, in Hennepin County, 
more than half the offenders who were presumed to go to prison 
did not.  Of the ones who did go, slightly more than half served less 
time than they would have been presumed to serve. 
Similar 1995–2002 figures were compiled for several judicial 
districts aggregated as “Greater [Minnesota].”111  The average drug 
case dispositional departure rate in this sample was nearly 26%,112 
much more than the anticipated 10%,113 but less than half of the 
Hennepin County rate.114  For drug case mitigated durational 
departure rates, the average for “Greater [Minnesota]” was nearly 
23%, again more than 10% but less than half the Hennepin County 
rate.115  In sum, drug offenders were receiving the presumed 
sentence only in about 25–50% of the cases, and the odds of going 
to prison for the same crime were very different for residents of 
different parts of the state. 
By 2010, data was available for each judicial district that 
showed the percent of drug offenders who received the presumed 
sentence.  The “Greater [Minnesota]” data is disaggregated to show 
what happened in 2008 in each of the ten districts.116  Following are 
the “Greater [Minnesota]” districts, with a short geographical 
locator, and the percentage of drug offenders who actually received 
the presumed sentence: 
•Third  (southeast—includes Rochester) 61%
•Fifth  (southwest—includes Mankato) 30%
•Sixth  (northeast—includes Duluth) 46%
•Seventh (west central—includes St. Cloud 57%
•Eighth  (west—includes Willmar)  83%





 110. See id. at 41 fig.32 (dividing the sum of the data by the eight years 
measured). 
 111. Id. at 41 figs.31, 32. 
 112. See id. at 41 fig.31 (dividing the sum of the data by the eight years 
measured). 
 113. See supra text accompanying note 106. 
 114. See REPORT, supra note 70, at 41 fig.31 (dividing the sum of the data by the 
eight years measured). 
 115. Id. at fig.32 (dividing the sum of the data by the eight years measured). 
 116. See DRUG DEPARTURES & REVOCATIONS BY RACE, supra note 97, at Types of 
Sentence Pronounced for Presumptive Commits by Judicial District. 
 117. Id.  
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Hennepin County and the First District (south metro) are 
comparable to the Fifth District, at around 30%.118 
A drug offender convicted of the same offense and presumed 
to be bound for prison—charge bargaining may play a part here 
but is impossible to factor in—has an 83% chance to get the 
presumed sentence in Willmar, but only 30% in Mankato.  Overall, 
drug sentences under the Guidelines show far less uniformity than 
the hoped-for 10% departure rate.  Achieving this 10% goal would 
have shown more consistency than the parole board.  Moreover, 
the departures have enshrined disparate local sentencing patterns 
which the statewide parole board would have ironed out in earlier 
decades. 
IV. IN SEARCH OF STRATEGIES THAT MIGHT WORK: A 21ST 
CENTURY JUSTICE SYSTEM LOOKS FOR PATHS OUT OF THE 
GUIDELINES 
We have seen that Minnesota’s official sentencing policy has 
been to have “just deserts”; that is, clearly defined prison sentences 
that are consistent, proportional, and economical.  This policy of 
retribution was adopted instead of pursuing solutions intended to 
rehabilitate the most amenable and incapacitate the most 
dangerous.  Simple as “just deserts” appears to be, it has been 
impossible to implement—at least in the areas of sex and drug 
crimes—because policymakers other than the Sentencing 
Guidelines Commission want something more than retributive 
sentences taken from a chart.119  Legislators, corrections officials, 
judges, and lawyers all want to be doing something more 
substantive.  They want the justice system to prevent future crimes 
by keeping very dangerous people away from society while also 
giving less serious offenders a path back to community life.  
Moreover, practitioners are oriented toward making a difference in 
each case, rather than fitting hundreds of cases into a prefabricated 
 
 118. Id.  It is hard not to speculate on the variances among counties within a 
judicial district.  For example, Blue Earth County—where Mankato and a state 
university are located—may be the “Hennepin County” of the Fifth Judicial 
District. 
 119. See Sentencing and Correctional Policy, PROGRAM EVALUATION DIV. OFFICE OF 
THE LEGIS. AUDITOR (June 1991), http://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/ped/1991
/pe9107.htm (“[J]udges and others . . . pursue sentencing goals other than 
uniform and proportional punishment.  Potential for rehabilitation, threat to 
public safety, and deterrence of repeat offenses, are all considerations that enter 
into the sentencing decision.  The guidelines may be too narrowly constructed . . . .”). 
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system.  As a result, they have initiated new strategies, attempting to 
wriggle out of the straitjacket that the Guidelines have become. 
These strategies have an implementation track record that 
shows how costs can be reduced while lowering the crime rate.  
This section highlights these approaches, which broadly are 
characterized by four features:  
• Focus on specific groups of offenders that might be taken 
out of the Guidelines; 
• Screening of individuals in the groups for suitability for an 
alternative strategy; 
• Provision of services other than pure incarceration for the 
selected offenders; and 
• Evaluation of the results and refinement of the strategy 
based upon its outcome. 
As will be seen, these efforts are precursors to a way of thinking 
about sentencing that has come to be known as “Evidence-Based 
Practices” (EBP).120  Strategies based on empirical evidence have 
been implemented within the corrections system and by judges as 
the criminal justice system works to become more effective with less 
funding.121  It is wise to pay attention to the lessons learned both by 
the corrections system and by specialty courts as the criminal justice 
system has struggled to accommodate consistently large volumes of 
offenders.  Additionally, EBP use has worked to find an effective 
way of responding to sex offenders122 and people convicted of 
controlled substances offenses.123 
V. LESSONS MINNESOTA HAS ALREADY LEARNED ABOUT 
USING EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES TO FIGHT CRIME AND 
REDUCE COST 
Those who work in the criminal justice system can point to 
instances where seasoned professionals’ experience, wisdom, and 
instinct have allowed them to predict an offender’s risk to reoffend.  
Yet the body of evidence shows that seasoned professionals’ “gut 
feelings” have a track record inferior to the actuarial risk 
 
 120. See Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Sentencing: The Application of Evidence-
Based Practice to State Sentencing Practice and Policy, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 585, 586 (2009) 
(describing EBP as “corrections practices that have been proven by the most 
rigorous ‘what works’ research to significantly reduce offender recidivism”). 
 121. See infra Part V. 
 122. See infra Part V.B. 
 123. See infra Part V.C. 
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assessment tools that form the basis for evidence-based practices.124 
Increasingly over the past twenty years, corrections officials 
have used decision-making processes that rely in part on actuarially 
proven EBPs.125  They are used to guide decisions at all levels of the 
corrections delivery system, from probation officers responding to 
failures of offenders by imposing suspended jail or prison time, to 
prison officials predicting inmate misbehavior, to the Hearings and 
Release Unit making cost-effective reentry supervision.126  These 
practices have been increasingly relied upon because the evidence 
shows they reduce both recidivism and cost.127  Minnesota’s EBP 
successes mirror progress made nationally,128 and provide guidance 
to court officers and policy makers wishing to pursue “smarter 
sentencing” initiatives based on EBP. 
Advances in the science of corrections can be used to enhance 
Minnesota sentencing practices in ways that reduce overall cost and 
recidivism.  EBP’s demonstrated benefits in the corrections end of 
the business—lower cost and reduced recidivism—are also available 
to judges making sentencing decisions.  The affected population of 
people convicted of crimes is identical to the one the corrections 
system has shown to be effectively managed using EBP.  The 
difference between a judge’s use of EBP and corrections’ use of 
EBP involves the passage of time: judges make decisions earlier in 
an offender’s criminal justice system experience, while corrections’ 
decision-making comes later.  This timing variance may increase or 
decrease the effectiveness of EBP.  Perhaps a significant factor is 
whether an offender has yet had the “taste” of incarceration (less 
 
 124. Christopher T. Lowenkamp & Kristin Bechtel, The Predictive Validity of the LSI-
R on a Sample of Offenders Drawn from the Records of the Iowa Department of Corrections Data 
Management System, 71 FED. PROBATION  (Dec. 2007), http://www.uscourts.gov
/uscourts/FederalCourts/PPS/Fedprob/2007-12/predictiveValidity.html.  
 125. See Warren, supra note 120, at 596 (“[A] large body of rigorous research 
proving that treatment programs operated in accord with rigorous research-based 
evidence can significantly change offender behavior and reduce recidivism.”); 
Evidence-Based Practices, MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., https://forums.doc.state.mn.us/site
/ebp/default.aspx (last visited Dec. 5, 2010). 
 126. Nancy M. Campbell, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK 
FOR PAROLING AUTHORITIES IN AN ERA OF EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES, 30–41 (2008), 
available at http://www.nicic.gov/Downloads/PDF/Library/022906.pdf. 
 127. Dr. Chris Bray, Deputy Comm’r of Corr., Minn. Dep’t of Corr., 
Presentation to Corrections Strategic Management and Operations Advisory Task 
Force, Stillwater Prison, Bayport, Minnesota (Oct. 19, 2009). 
 128. For national recidivism results, see NAT’L INST. CORR., A FRAMEWORK FOR 
EVIDENCE-BASED DECISION MAKING IN LOCAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS (2010), 
available at http://cepp.com/documents/EBDM%20Framework.pdf. 
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likely at the time of sentence and more likely during correctional 
supervision). 
Integrating EBP into the sentencing process requires some 
reflection about public policy driving our long-established 
practices.  It is pretty easy to understand the “just deserts” basis 
underlying traditional sentencing policy; just about everyone is 
willing to sign onto a plan to “get the bad guy” and make him pay 
for his sins.  So central is retribution to our common mindset that 
it occupies themes at the core of the world’s major religions and 
cultural iconography related to justice.  Lady Justice after all, 
carries not just a set of scales, but in the other hand a sword. 
Despite retribution’s popular appeal, evidence brought to light 
by EBP helps identify those situations in which retribution 
unproductively increases either cost, recidivism, or both.  Alertness 
to the cost and flaws of “just deserts” sentencing policy helps pave 
the way for fiscally sound, data-driven approaches.  
A. EBP Lessons from Corrections: Using Evidence to Manage Volume 
The Commissioner of Corrections is responsible for an 
enterprise that costs nearly a half-billion dollars a year,129 employs 
about 4300 people,130 and—here’s the tricky bit—operates at 
ninety-eight percent of capacity.131  The Department faces steadily 
increasing demand132 at a time in which the state faces multiple 
unprecedented fiscal crises.133 
The Commissioner faces these hurdles even though Minnesota 
tends to put people in prison at a rate that is less than most other 
states.  Minnesota ranks forty-ninth in its per capita rate of adult 
 
 129. AGENCY PROFILE, MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., 2010 BIENNIAL BUDGET 5 (2009) 
(showing biennial budget just under one billion dollars) (on file with author 
Robert Sykora). 
 130. MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., POSITIONS BY BUDGET ORGANIZATIONS—FY2010, at 
1–4 (2009) (provided to Department of Corrections Strategic Management and 
Operations Advisory Task Force) (on file with author Robert Sykora). 
 131. MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., FACILITY DESIGN CAPACITY COMPARED TO ACTUAL 
DAILY POPULATION (provided to Department of Corrections Strategic Management 
and Operations Advisory Task Force) (on file with author Robert Sykora). 
 132. See HEATHER C. WEST, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 
2009 STATISTICAL TABLES 5 (2010) (showing that the number of prisoners under 
the authority of Minnesota state officials increased 5.2% from December 31, 2007, 
to June 30, 2008, and 1.6% from December 31, 2008, to June 30, 2009). 
 133. See, e.g., Baird Helgeson & Pat Doyle, Painful Projection: $6.2 Billion Deficit, 
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Dec. 2, 2010, at A1. 
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imprisonment.134  But this comparison is damnation by faint praise: 
the United States as a whole imprisons its people at a rate higher 
than any other country on Earth, locking up 748 people per 
100,000 of its population,135 a proportion greater than the Russian 
Federation (585 per 100,000)136 and more than double South 
Africa’s rate at the height of apartheid (368 per 100,000).137 
Decision-making about who goes to prison in Minnesota also 
warrants close attention.  People of color amount to 46.8% of 
Minnesota’s prison population but only 9.2% of Minnesota’s 
population as a whole.138  Prison population numbers and racial 
disparities are only part of the story—overall correctional control 
rates must be part of the analysis as well.  With a rate of 1 in 26 
people in the population either locked up or on probation or 
supervised release, Minnesota has the fourth highest correctional 
control rate in the nation.139  This rate has increased significantly 
since 1982, when Minnesota ranked twenty-first in the nation with 1 
in 114 people under correctional control.140  Over the past thirty 
years, Minnesota has experienced an ever-increasing flow of people 
into its criminal justice system. 
Most people locked up in Minnesota “worked pretty hard to 
get there,” believes Kathleen Gearin, Chief Judge of the state court 
district located in Ramsey County.141  Judge Gearin notes that “there 
are a few who’ve gone to prison on first time convictions for 
murder or sexual assault, but most have stood before a judge over 
and over and heard the threat of prison multiple times before they 
 
 134. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN 
CORRECTIONS 43 (2009) [hereinafter THE LONG REACH], available at 
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/PSPP_1in31_report_FINAL
_WEB_3-26-09.pdf. 
 135. Int’l Ctr. for Prison Studies, Prison Population Rates Per 100,000 of the 
National Population, KING’S COLLEGE LONDON,  http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/law
/research/icps/worldbrief/wpb_stats.php?area=all&category=wb_poprate (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2011). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Global Comparisons—Crime and Incarceration Around the World: U.S. vs. South 
Africa, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, (citing PETER WAGNER, THE PRISON INDEX: TAKING 
THE PULSE OF THE CRIME CONTROL INDUSTRY (2003)), http://www.prisonpolicy.org
/prisonindex/us_southafrica.html  (last visited Jan. 3, 2011).   
 138. Adult Inmate Profile, supra note 2.               THE LONG REACH, supra note 
134, at 44 tbl. A5.            Id. 
 139. THE LONG REACH, supra note 134, at 44 tbl. A5.             
 140. Id. 
 141. Interview with Hon. Kathleen Gearin, Chief Judge Second Judicial Dist. of 
Minn. (July 27, 2010).  
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actually got sent there.”142  Of those incarcerated on a felony 
sentence, about one-fifth reoffend and return to prison within 
three years of release.143  Policy makers seem to focus on the twenty 
percent recidivism rate and conclude that “nothing works.”  More 
productive conclusions may be available if we focus upon the eighty 
percent of offenders who do not recidivate. 
The eighty percent success rate is even more remarkable 
considering that corrections officials do not control the flow of 
people into their system, the courts do.  “Corrections is a lot like a 
bathtub.  You can never let the tub overflow, yet you have no 
control over the water supply and only limited control of the 
drain,” mused one veteran corrections official.144  
“Limited control” of the number of people leaving prison 
exists as a function of Minnesota’s system of determinate 
sentencing.  Judges commit offenders to the commissioner of 
corrections to be incarcerated for the number of months set forth 
in the Commission’s matrix.145  After offenders have served two-
thirds of the time, the commissioner has the discretion to let the 
offender out of prison on “supervised release”—an option 
analogous to what is called parole in other states.146  Exercise of this 
discretion—and similar judgments used to determine whether a 
released offender should return to serve more time after a 
violation—is the “limited control of the drain.”147  It amounts to the 
Commissioner’s only ability to directly affect the number of people 
in prison. 
Properly exercised, this control lowers cost (prison costs 
$89.77 a day and the daily cost of probation and parole is $3.73) 
and fights crime, as resources are focused where they are most 
effective—on offenders committed to the commissioner who have 
the greatest likelihood to reoffend.148 
 
 142. Id.  
 143. State Recidivism Studies, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (2010), available at 
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_StateRecidivismStudies2010.pdf.  
 144. Interview with Daniel Storkamp, Assistant Comm’r of Mgmt. Servs., Minn. 
Dep’t of Corr. (Oct. 2003). 
 145. MINN. STAT. § 244.101 (2008). 
 146. Id. § 244.195 (2008). 
 147. See Warren, supra note 120; see also supra text accompanying note 122. 
 148. See generally Warren, supra note 120 (showing greater prison spending 
does not increase public safety, whereas various innovations in community 
corrections, such as sorting offenders by their public safety risk level, have proven 
successful in reducing recidivism while saving states money).  For per diem rates, 
see THE LONG REACH FACT SHEETS, supra note 11. 
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Courts and corrections already use EBPs to control recidivism 
and cost.149  EBP approaches have had much more support (and 
have shown much more success) with controlled substance 
offenders rather than those convicted of sex crimes.150  But the 
legislature has shown interest in a new approach to sex crimes as 
well, and Minnesota has some of the tools in place that could make 
it happen. 
B. EBP Lessons from Corrections: The Search for Cost-Effective 
Incapacitation of Sex Offenders 
At the inception of the Guidelines, the presumed sentence for 
criminal sexual conduct in the first degree was forty-three months, 
two-thirds of which would be served in prison.151  Longer sentences 
could be ordered through the durational departure process, but as 
the Minnesota Supreme Court repeatedly made clear, departures 
needed to be based on the facts of the offense—like “particular 
cruelty”—rather than on concern for what the offender might do 
in the future.152   
Horrendous high-profile sex offenses led to a search for means 
to keep dangerous sex offenders in secure settings, regardless of 
the release date determined by the Guidelines.153  Minnesota 
amended its civil commitment statutes in 1994 to provide for the 
civil commitment of individuals found to be “sexually dangerous 
persons” or “sexual psychopathic personalities.”154  In the era of 
 
 149. See text accompanying note 122.  
 150. See Roger K. Warren, Evidence-based Practices and State Sentencing Policy: Ten 
Policy Initiatives to Reduce Recidivism, 82 IND. L.J. 1307, 1309 (2007) (highlighting the 
success in recidivism reduction in state drug courts and other “problem-solving 
courts” where sentencing practices most closely follow EBP than other 
adjudications). 
 151. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, SENTENCING GRID (1981), available 
at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/guidelines/grids/grid_1981.pdf. 
 152. State v. Partlow, 321 N.W.2d 886, 887 (Minn. 1982) (“Our system of 
criminal law permits the confinement of persons for acts they have committed, but 
does not permit present confinement for acts which may be committed in the 
future.”). 
 153. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT, GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON SEX OFFENDER POLICY 
7 (2005) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT], available at http://www.doc.state.mn.us
/commissionsexoffenderpolicy/commissionfinalreport.pdf (alluding to events 
that prompted the reevaluation of Minnesota’s sex offender laws and the new 
processes for civilly committing certain sex offenders). 
 154.  1994 Minn. Laws 5.  The statutes are Minnesota Statutes, section 253B.02, 
subdivisions 18(b) and 18(c).  Minnesota’s commitment procedure was found to 
be constitutional in In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 171, 176 (Minn. 1996) (finding that 
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indeterminate parole board sentencing, these provisions were 
relatively rarely used.  Perhaps due to the determinate nature of 
the Guidelines, there was a rapid increase in commitment with this 
population growing from 61 in 1994, to 252 in 2004, and then to 
587 in 2010, due to offenders recidivating after release.155  The 
Minnesota Sex Offender Program population now includes 
committed individuals up to eighty-five years of age.156 
Besides lingering doubts about the double jeopardy aroma 
that arises from the practice of stacking an indefinite commitment 
on top of a long determinate sentence, the program is quite 
expensive.  As of October 20, 2010, the cost is $328 per day per 
resident, $119,720 per year.157  As a result, the Governor’s 
Commission on Sex Offender Policy recommended in 2005, that 
Minnesota use a hybrid determinate/indeterminate sentencing 
strategy for sex offenders, with the Guidelines sentence to become 
a minimum sentence, and a “Sex Offender Release Board” to make 
the ultimate decision about when to release the individual.158  The 
2005 legislature declined to adopt this approach, instead adding 
several sex offender life sentences, plus a second Guidelines grid 
for repeat sex offenders, while allowing the civilly committed 
population to continue increasing.159 
It remains to be seen if this “determinate sentence plus 
commitment” strategy of incapacitation will survive Minnesota’s 
prolonged state budget crisis.  In 2010, the Chair of the House 
Public Safety Finance Division introduced a bill to reinstate a 
parole board.160  Then, in the bonding bill, the legislature provided 
$47,500,000 to expand the sex offender commitment facility at 
Moose Lake.  The legislature also required a multi-agency study to 
 
civil commitment is “not punishment”). 
 155. FINAL REPORT, supra note 153, at 24; Minnesota Sex Offender Program FAQs, 
MINN. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVICES, http://www.dhs.state.mn.us/main/idcplg?IdcService
=GET_DYNAMIC_CONVERSION&RevisionSelectionMethod=LatestReleased&dD
ocName=dhs16_149915# (last visited Jan. 4, 2011).  Consider, for example, the 
initial Guidelines sentence for first degree criminal sexual conduct was forty-three 
months, so that the majority of those offenders would have been discharged from 
prison after serving about three years.  Such a scenario would not have been 
possible under indeterminate sentencing because individuals believed to be 
dangerous could have been kept in prison up to the statutory maximum. 
 156. MINN. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 155. 
 157. See id. 
 158. FINAL REPORT, supra note 153, at 10–12. 
 159. See 2005 Minn. Laws 928–33. 
 160. H.F. 3526, 2010 Leg., 86th Sess. (Minn. 2010). 
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consider, among other things, “possible legislation to change 
determinate sentencing for sex offenders.”161 
An EBP is the most crucial component of a system that would 
enable release decisions to be based on the risks posed by an 
individual, rather than on the Guidelines grid.  This EBP was 
developed in Minnesota and has been used since 1997.162  The EBP, 
known as the Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool-Revised 
(MnSOST-R) is an actuarial risk assessment tool.163  The MnSOST-R 
can be administered to an individual by a caseworker and uses 
sixteen empirically verifiable items—rather than clinical 
judgment—to predict sex offense recidivism.164  The MnSOST-R is 
the basis in Minnesota for both the classification of released 
offenders who are subject to community notification and decisions 
made by Department of Corrections officials about who should be 
referred for possible Sexually Dangerous Person or Sexually 
Psychopathic Personality civil commitment proceedings.165 
This screening process has critics.  Some say it leads to unfair 
deprivations of liberty, and others say it is the basis of a system in 
which some very dangerous individuals can still slip through the 
cracks.166  But with no parole board to review offenders’ extensive 
files after years in prison, someone has to make decisions.  As the 
creators of the MnSOST-R put it: 
If the probability of dangerousness is over-predicted (false 
positives), many offenders are unnecessarily deprived of 
their liberty and placed in treatment that is both 
expensive and prolonged.  If the probability of 
dangerousness is predicted too conservatively (false 
negatives), dangerous sex offenders are released without 






 161. 2010 Minn. Laws 78–79. 
 162. DOUGLAS L. EPPERSON ET AL., MINNESOTA SEX OFFENDER SCREENING TOOL—
REVISED (MNSOST-R) TECHNICAL PAPER: DEVELOPMENT, VALIDATION, AND 
RECOMMENDED RISK LEVEL CUT SCORES 5 (2003), available at 
http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/faculty/epperson/TechUpdatePaper12-03.pdf. 
 163. Id. at 27. 
 164. Id. at 2–8. 
 165. Id. at 2.  
 166. Gunderson, supra note 30. 
 167. Epperson, supra note 162, at 4. 
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Harley Nelson, Deputy Commissioner of Corrections, suggests 
the MnSOST-R is “not perfect, . . . but . . . it is the best available 
tool for categorizing sex offenders.”168   
Meanwhile, there have also been major recent improvements 
in the supervision of sex offenders on release status.169  Small 
caseloads, frequent face-to-face contacts, familiarity with the 
offender’s family and community, advanced training, use of 
polygraphs, and the availability of a range of community-based 
treatment options all make it possible for supervision to be much 
more effective than it was in the past.170  These innovations, too, are 
evaluated on an ongoing, iterative basis.171 
The creators of the Sentencing Guidelines did not believe that 
sentencing could prevent crime.  They sought to give a fair amount 
of punishment for each crime that had already taken place.172  With 
the new assessment tools and supervision capabilities that have 
evolved since 1980, however, it is not unreasonable to imagine that 
the 2011 legislature might follow up its question to the Department 
of Human Services—regarding whether to “change determinate 
sentencing for sex offenders”—with some real action.173  In the 
2011 legislative session, some sex offenders could be selected for 
very long terms of confinement, and others might be returned to 
the community sooner than they would have been under the 
Guidelines.   
 
 
 168. Gunderson, supra note 30. 
 169. See generally OFFICE OF THE LEGIS. AUDITOR, STATE OF MINN., EVALUATION 
REPORT: COMMUNITY SUPERVISION OF SEX OFFENDERS (2005) [hereinafter SUPERVISION 
OF SEX OFFENDERS REPORT], available at http://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us
/ped/pedrep/0503all.pdf; MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., MINNESOTA SEX OFFENDER 
MANAGEMENT: FINAL REPORT (2007) [hereinafter SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT 
REPORT], available at http://www.corr.state.mn.us/publications/legislativereports
/documents/SOreport02-07_000.pdf. 
 170. SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT REPORT, supra note 169, at 2–10. 
 171.  For examples of such ongoing re-evaluations, compare the reports from 
OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, infra note 181 
with SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT REPORT, supra note 169, at 8–10.  
 172. Von Hirsch, supra note 6, at 188–89.  
 173. J. of the House, 86th Sess., § 17, subdiv. 6 (Minn. 2010) (requesting the 
commissioner of human services to conduct a study and report on possible changes to 
the system), available at http://156.98.78.180/cco/journals/2009-10/J0311073.htm 
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C. EBP Lessons from Corrections: Supervising Selected Drug Offenders 
In and Out of Prison  
Before the advent of the Guidelines, rehabilitation was “the 
primary goal” of sentencing.174  The parole board could release an 
offender from prison when it decided that release would be 
“conducive to his rehabilitation.”175  The Guidelines were adopted 
at a time when criminologists believed that rehabilitation did not 
work and that offenders in prison were manipulating the system by 
posing as good candidates for parole.176 
Accordingly, the law that created the Guidelines provided that 
all mental health, employment, and educational programs in the 
prisons would be completely voluntary and would have “no effect 
on the length of [the] sentence.”177  These programs were to be 
limited to whatever could be provided with the funding 
appropriated for this purpose.178  This approach makes sense if one 
believes, as the Guidelines developers did, that the purpose of a 
prison sentence was limited to “just deserts.”179  Under the 
Guidelines, rehabilitation was no longer the purpose of the 
sentence.180 
Yet it is impossible to ignore the severity of the drug and 
alcohol problems that plague the majority of offenders sentenced 
to prison.  A 2004 study found that sixty-four percent of these 
persons were “chemically dependent” and another twenty-five 
percent were “chemically abusive.”181  As this reality was better 
understood, and as the number of drug offenders in prison 
multiplied from 276 in 1990 to 2178 in 2005, the need for chemical 
dependency treatment in prison became undeniable even though 




 174. Rathke, supra note 1, at 272. 
 175. MINN. STAT. § 609.12, subdiv. 1 (1980). 
 176. LeSuer, supra note 5, at 294–96, 300 (discussing the move away from the 
goal of rehabilitation and the adoption of the “just deserts” model instead). 
 177. Act of April 5, 1978, ch. 723, art. 1, §§ 2–3, 1978 Minn. Laws 762, 762–63. 
 178. Id. at § 3. 
 179. See LeSuer, supra note 5, at 297–300 (explaining the “just deserts” model). 
 180. See id. at 296–97. 
 181. OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 88 (2006) 
[hereinafter SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT], available at http://www.auditor
.leg.state.mn.us/ped/pedrep/subabuse.pdf. 
 182. Id. at 85. 
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In 1999, the Commissioner of Corrections acquired the power 
to require inmates to participate in rehabilitative programs and the 
power to use the prison disciplinary process to extend the 
incarceration of those who refused.183  At this point, the offender 
was governed by the worst of two worlds.  The Guidelines sentence 
was the “just deserts” for a criminal act, the liability for which could 
not be mitigated by the voluntary use of intoxicants, yet he or she 
could be required to go to chemical dependency treatment or else 
serve more time.184  To make matters worse, there were not nearly 
enough treatment beds available in the prisons, which had received 
minimal funding for rehabilitative programs.185 
The outcome was that the legislature decided in 2005 to allow 
early release from prison for certain offenders who met a long list 
of requirements for eligibility.  Two of the requirements were that 
the person must be a drug offender without a violent history and 
must have completed chemical dependency treatment in the 
institution.186  In fact, the treatment had to include education and 
other features to build the inmate’s self-worth.187  Moreover, the 
legislature required the Commissioner to offer “suitable” chemical 
dependency treatment to all inmates who fit the profile.188  Similar 
opportunities were available to inmates who qualified for the 
Challenge Incarceration Program, including “culturally sensitive” 
chemical dependency programs and programs to help the inmates 
cope with stress.189 
D. EBP Lessons From Corrections: Challenge Incarceration Program 
Rehabilitation had been rehabilitated with more rigor.  The 
Challenge Incarceration Program (CIP) included a requirement 
for an evaluation of its effectiveness.190  Not only did the 
Department of Corrections evaluate the program, so did the 
Legislative Auditor.191  The CIP produced markedly improved 
results.  Twenty-six percent of those who completed CIP were 
 
 183. Act of May 3, 1999, ch. 126, §§ 8–9, 1999 Minn. Laws 516, 521–22. 
 184. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, MINNESOTA SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY § II.D.103 (2)(a)(3) (2010). 
 185. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, supra note 181, at 92. 
 186. MINN. STAT. § 244.055 (2008). 
 187. Id., subdiv. 4. 
 188. Id., subdiv. 3. 
 189. Id. § 244.171, subdiv. 2 (2008). 
 190. Id. § 244.173 (2008). 
 191. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, supra note 181, at 14.  
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arrested again within three years, compared to 64% of those 
released who completed short-term programs, and 59% of all 
chemically dependent releasees.192   
Better still, only 4% of the people who completed CIP were 
actually convicted of a serious offense within three years, compared 
to 37% of chemically dependent releasees as a whole.193  It turned 
out that it was possible to select a group of offenders who had 
received Guidelines sentences, let them apply for a program of 
rehabilitative services, provide the services, and grant the offenders 
early release—and they would succeed.  Their success could be 
proven, despite an approach totally contrary to the philosophy of 
the Sentencing Guidelines. 
E. EBP Lessons from the Judiciary: Reducing Recidivism and Cost 
with Drug Courts 
Meanwhile, in the judicial branch of government, another 
form of EBP was beginning to grow: drug courts.  Proponents 
asked: Why not select drug offenders who are supposed to be 
incarcerated, provide them with rehabilitative services, supervision, 
drug testing, and regular meetings with a judge and not send them 
to prison at all? 
The literature on the philosophy, history, and operation of 
drug courts is too voluminous to review here in any detail.  For the 
purposes of this discussion, it is enough to demonstrate that in the 
sentencing of felony drug offenders, drug courts have been 
successful because they have followed a much different path than 
the one laid out in the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.194  
Moreover, the drug courts can prove their success—as any sound 
EBP should be able to do—by documenting decreased recidivism.195 
 
 192. Id. at 104–05. 
 193. Id. 
 194. For a broader introduction to drug courts, see generally 2 NAT'L DRUG 
COURT INST., PAINTING THE CURRENT PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON DRUG 
COURTS (C. West Huddleston, III et al. eds., 2008), available at http://www.ndci.org
/sites/default/files/ndci/PCPII1_web%5B1%5D.pdf; NAT'L DRUG COURT INST., 
DRUG COURT REVIEW (Steven R. Belenko, Ph.d. et al. eds., 2006), available at 
http://www.ndci.org/sites/default/files/ndci/DCR.IV2_.pdf; CTR. FOR COURT 
INNOVATION, A PROBLEM-SOLVING REVOLUTION: MAKING CHANGE HAPPEN IN STATE 
COURTS (Berman, Fox & Wolf eds., 2004); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DRUG COURTS: 
THE KEY CONCEPTS (The Nat’l Ass’n of Drug Court Prof’ls & Drug Court Standards 
Comm. eds.,1997); MINNESOTA OFFENDER DRUG COURT STANDARDS No. 511.1, 3 
(2009) [hereinafter DRUG COURT STANDARDS]. 
 195. 2 NATIONAL DRUG COURT INSTITUTE, supra note 194, at 6 (“Four 
32
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 14
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss2/14
 
458 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:2 
First, the program selects drug court participants based on 
public, objective criteria that have been developed collaboratively 
by a drug court planning team.196  Note how different this is from 
any of the following more traditional sentencing methods: 
a)  Determinate sentencing.  The Guidelines grid calls for 
forty-eight months of incarceration for a first-offense 
violation of the law against second-degree possession of 
controlled substances;197 or 
b)  Departure-based sentencing.  The judge has a hunch, 
and/or the prosecutor and defense lawyer establish 
through plea negotiation, that the individual deserves a 
mitigated dispositional departure, so (as happens more 
than half the time) the forty-eight month sentence is 
stayed and a period of probation is imposed;198 or 
c)  Indeterminate sentencing.  The offender goes to 
prison for zero to ten years, but after two years is released 
on parole because the parole board deems him “ready for 
rehabilitation.”199 
Second, the drug court provides a range of services to the 
individual, including supervision, drug testing, and frequent 
contact with the judge.200  This latter feature is much different from 
the three alternatives above, because the judge—and in fact the 
whole “Drug Court Team”—stays in the picture, rather than 
relinquishing the offender to the state or local corrections 
department.  The court’s effort is aimed not at making the 
offender serve a specific amount of time consistent with other 
second-degree offenders; rather, the court is trying to give the 








independent meta-analyses have now concluded that drug courts significantly 
reduce crime rates . . . .”). 
 196. DRUG COURT STANDARDS, supra note 194, at 3.  
 197. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, SENTENCING GRID (2010), available 
at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/guidelines/grids/grid_2010.pdf. 
 198. See supra Part III.C. 
 199. See LeSuer, supra note 5, at 294. 
 200. Id. at 7–9 (enumerating standards V, VI, VII, and VIII). 
 201. See generally CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, supra note 194.  
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Finally, the governing body of the court system ensures that 
the efforts of the drug courts are periodically evaluated.202  In 
Minnesota, there are three key questions to be asked in the 
evaluation process: (1) Do the drug courts enhance public safety?; 
(2) Do the drug courts hold the offenders accountable?; and (3) 
Do the drug courts reduce costs to society?203  Ongoing evaluation 
of this sort allows for refinements over time to take advantage of 
the most effective approaches and to abandon those approaches 
found least effective. 
Just like the steady evolution of EBPs guiding decisions within 
the Department of Corrections, the drug court model is shaped 
around two persistent questions: (1) are we helping to prevent 
crime; and (2) are our programs cost effective?204  EBP as deployed 
by Corrections and drug courts are precursors to a sentencing 
system that can be much more fully based on evidence about 
recidivism and cost reduction. 
VI. SMARTER SENTENCING AND CRIME-PREVENTION 
JURISPRUDENCE: SUPPLEMENTING ART WITH SCIENCE, 
REPLACING HUNCH WITH EVIDENCE 
Rational empiricists highly value and respect evidence.  It 
is systematic, objective, replicable evidence that makes or 
breaks a theory.  Without a strong respect for evidence, we 
are left with personal, ideological explanations of a 
phenomenon.205 
“‘[C]orrections’ is more science than art,” writes Judge Roger 
K. Warren, President Emeritus of the National Center for State 
Courts (NCSC).206  The science of corrections has evolved over time 
in the same way that other disciplines have become more 
sophisticated.  The practice of medicine is a good model, as it has 
 
 202. See DRUG COURT STANDARDS, supra note 194, at 11 (“At a minimum of 
once every two years, drug court teams should . . . assess team functionality, review 
all policies and procedures, and assess the overall functionality of the court.”); 
MINN. JUDICIAL BRANCH, STATEWIDE DRUG COURT EVALUATION PLAN 3 (2008) 
[hereinafter EVALUATION PLAN]. 
 203. See EVALUATION PLAN, supra note 202, at 5–7. 
 204. See id. 
 205. James Bonta, Offender Risk Assessment and Sentencing, 49 CANADIAN J. 
CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 519, 520 (2007). 
 206. ROGER K. WARREN, CRIME AND JUSTICE INST. & NAT'L INST. CORR., EVIDENCE-
BASED PRACTICE TO REDUCE RECIDIVISM 25–26 (2007), available at 
http://ncsconline.org/csi/Reduce-Recidivism.pdf. 
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clearly evolved over time to become an EBP.  No longer do 
physicians bleed their clients or attach leeches to them; rather, they 
prescribe medication for their clients with the confidence that 
clinical trials support their decision.  Similar evolutions have 
occurred in the field of corrections and are adaptable for use by 
sentencing judges. 
Corrections professionals document a ten to thirty percent 
recidivism reduction when they replace intuition and hunch with 
EBPs.207  “Smarter sentencing” and “crime-prevention 
jurisprudence” are phrases used to describe application of EBP 
knowledge by judges when crafting a sentence.208  At the core of 
EBP knowledge is the risk, need, and responsivity model which 
addresses the questions who, what, and how, as discussed below:209 
1. The Risk Principle: who is and is not most likely to be 
successful in a recidivism reduction program?  By using 
validated actuarial risk assessment tools such as the 
Level of Service Inventory–Revised (LSI-R),210 the EBP 
practitioner determines who is at greatest risk to 
reoffend and targets resources to address those 
offenders.211  Over-responding to low-risk offenders can 
actually increase their recidivism rate, while at the same 
time depleting resources that could be used to respond 
to those at higher risk.212 
 
 207. See NAT’L INST. CORR., A FRAMEWORK FOR EVIDENCE-BASED DECISION MAKING 
IN LOCAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 46 (3d ed. 2010), available at http://cepp.com
/documents/EBDM%20Framework.pdf. 
 208. See, e.g., D.A. Andrews & Craig Dowden, The Risk-Need-Responsivity Model of 
Assessment and Human Service in Prevention and Corrections: Crime-Prevention 
Jurisprudence, CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 439, 441–42 (2007).  See 
generally ROGER K. WARREN, PEW CTR. ON STATES, ARMING THE COURTS WITH 
RESEARCH: 10 EVIDENCE-BASED SENTENCING INITIATIVES TO CONTROL CRIME AND REDUCE 
COSTS (2009), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles
/Final_EBS_Brief.pdf. 
 209. See Andrews & Dowden, supra note 208, at 442–47. 
 210. Alexander Holsinger, Assessing Criminal Thinking: Attitudes and Orientations 
Influence Behavior, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Feb. 1999, at 23 (explaining that the LSI-R 
is a fifty-four question risk and need screening tool designed to predict likelihood 
of recidivism by measuring the offender’s circumstances regarding criminal 
history, education, employment, finances, family, drug use, and the like). A 
sample LSI-R profile is found at http://downloads.mhs.com/lsir/lsi-r-5-profile.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 22, 2010). 
 211. Id.  
 212. WARREN, supra note 206, at 26–27 (citing Christopher T. Lowenkamp & 
Edward J. Latessa, Understanding the Risk Principle: How and Why Correctional 
Interventions Can Harm Low-Risk Offenders, TOPICS IN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS 
2004).  
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2. The Need Principle: what of an offender’s 
characteristics can be successfully targeted for change?  
A health-related analogy helps illustrate the idea 
behind the need principle.  Think of a cardiac health 
screening with questions about diet, exercise, and 
family history, and how it helps us both evaluate risk 
and design a treatment regimen.  Cardiac patients and 
criminal offenders have a variety of needs, but only a 
subset of those needs are directly related to the 
outcome to be avoided (heart attack, recidivism).  
“Smart sentencing” requires that the judge have 
information available about the offender’s behaviors, 
attitudes, and values most closely associated with 
recidivism (called “criminogenic factors,” a phrase that 
has evolved to describe risk-related areas, which 
include determining the degree to which the offender 
has low self-control, anti-social personality, anti-social 
values, criminal peers, substance abuse, and a 
dysfunctional family).213 
3. The Responsivity Principle: how to go about addressing 
identified problems.  Judge Warren gives a good 
description: “it is not sufficient to determine only that 
the offender is an appropriate candidate for treatment 
and that there is a treatment resource available.  Given 
the risks and costs at stake, due diligence requires that 
a conscientious judge have some credible reason to 
believe that the program works for such offenders.”214 
Smart sentencing in action, then, looks something like this: as 
part of the pre-sentence investigation, the corrections worker uses 
an actuarial tool like the LSI-R to determine whether the offender 
is less likely to reoffend and therefore be amenable to have his 
behavior changed by interventions less costly than prison.  A pre-
sentence report advises the sentencing judge accordingly, 
including a narrative that describes the offender’s criminogenic 
factors such as his level of family support, the tendency of their 
peer group to commit crimes, and his alcohol or chemical use 
habits.  Designing a sentence that is effectively responsive to the 
problems shown by the offender often involves what Minnesota 
Judge Kathleen Gearin describes as “sending him to work on his 
 
 213. FAYE S. TAXMAN, ERIC S. SHEPARDSON & JAMES M. BYRNE, TOOLS OF THE 
TRADE: A GUIDE TO INCORPORATING SCIENCE INTO PRACTICE 28 (2004), available at 
http://nicic.gov/pubs/2004/020095.pdf. 
 214. WARREN, supra note 206, at 38. 
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cog skills,” that is, changing the offender’s thinking process 
through cognitive skills training.215 
Judge Gearin is a strong proponent of efforts to train judges in 
EBP-based smart sentencing practices, encouraging her colleagues 
to learn about EBPs used in sentencing.216  In her jurisdiction in 
late 2009, the Minnesota County Attorneys Association, the Justice 
Management Institute, and the Federal Bureau of Justice Assistance 
all sponsored EBP training.217  This smarter sentencing training is 
based on the core EBP principle that “risk reduction is key—
preventing tomorrow’s crime is just as important as punishing 
yesterday’s act.”218  The training is designed to help court officers 
learn to avoid traditional sentencing practices, which, by focusing 
too much on punishing yesterday’s act, actually may make 
tomorrow’s crime more likely.219 
This progress is not fast enough for Chief Judge Gearin.  She 
states: “I am very frustrated that Minnesota has not made more 
progress implementing evidence-based practices in the 
courtroom.”220  Slow progress towards EBP sentencing may be due 
to embedded judicial attitudes shaped during the years in which 
“nothing works” was the guiding philosophy in corrections.  
A. No Longer Can Our Sentencing Practices Be Shaped By the Belief 
That “Nothing Works:” In Fact, Something Clearly Does Work 
Judge Roger Warren of the NCSC writes that properly 
implemented smarter sentencing programs can fight crime and 
save money by reducing recidivism significantly.221  EBP sentencing 
 
 215. Interview with Hon. Kathleen Gearin, Chief Judge Second Judicial Dist. of 
Minn. (July 27, 2010); see also Corr. Serv. Can., Recidivism Is Predictable and Can Be 
Influenced: Using Risk Assessments to Reduce Recidivism, FORUM ON CORR. RESEARCH 
(1989), http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/pblct/forum/e012/e012j-eng.shtml (last 
visited Jan. 4, 2011). 
 216. Cf. Letter from Susan Gaertner, Ramsey Cnty. Attorney, to Chief Judge 
Kathleen Gearin, Second Judicial Dist. of Minn. (Sept. 20, 2009) (on file with 
author) (inviting recipients to represent Ramsey County in two-day training course 
focused on promoting evidence-based sentencing practices).  
 217. Course Description, Evidence Based Smarter Sentencing: Training for 
Judges, Prosecutors, Defense Attorneys, and Community Corrections Professionals 
(Oct. 21, 2009) (on file with author). 
 218. Id. at 1.  
 219. Id. 
 220. Interview with Hon. Kathleen Gearin, Chief Judge Second Judicial Dist. of 
Minn. (July 27, 2010).  
 221.  ROGER K. WARREN, NAT'L INST. OF CORR. AND CRIME & JUSTICE INST., 
EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE TO REDUCE RECIDIVISM: IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE JUDICIARIES 
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is supported by what Judge Warren described in 2007 as “a large 
body of rigorous research conducted over the last 20 years.”222  He 
believes that core EBP concepts like risk and needs assessment 
could be an effective complement to a determinate sentencing 
scheme such as the type employed in Minnesota.223  Judge Warren 
cautions that incorporating risk assessments into the sentencing 
process runs the risk of sanctions based on risk rather than offense 
severity, and such an outcome “might result in people going to 
prison who otherwise wouldn’t be sent there.”224  To avoid this 
result, a hybrid EBP/determinate sentencing approach could be 
taken to guide the sentencing judge’s discretion in what Judge 
Warren terms “the straddle-cell cases.”225  That is, the judge can use 
her discretion to tailor sentences to address individual defendants’ 
risk and needs while maintaining proportionality based upon 
seriousness of the offense.226 
The principal actuarial tool used to assess an offender’s 
recidivism risk is called the “LSI-R.”  It was co-written by Dr. James 
Bonta, who advises Public Safety Canada regarding sentencing 
policy and effective responses to criminal behavior.227  Dr. Bonta 
 
2 (2007), available at http://nicic.gov/Downloads/PDF/Library/023358.pdf.  
 222. Id. at 11. 
 223. Telephone interview with Hon. Roger K. Warren, President Emeritus, 
NCSC (July 30, 2010). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id.  
 226. For example, the risk assessment of a car thief may reveal propensity to 
commit greater crimes; nevertheless, a proper sentence must be proportional to 
the offense, not the propensity.  
 227. See Don Andrews & James Bonta, LSI-R—Level of Service Inventory-Revised, 
MULTI-HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC., About the Authors, http://www.mhs.com
/product.aspx?gr=saf&prod=lsi-r&id=resources (last visited Jan. 4, 2011) (“Dr. 
Bonta received his doctorate degree in Clinical Psychology from the University of 
Ottawa in 1979.  Prior to graduating he worked with conduct-disordered children 
and their families, provided assessments of youth for juvenile courts, and acted as 
a consultant at a training school for youth.  Upon graduating, Dr. Bonta became a 
psychologist at the Ottawa-Carleton Detention Centre, a maximum security 
remand center for adults and young offenders and later became Chief 
Psychologist at the institution.  During his 14 years at the detention centre, he 
established the only full-time psychology department in a jail setting in Canada.  
Dr. Bonta is currently the director of correction research for Public Safety and 
Emergency Preparedness Canada.  He is also a member of the Editorial Advisory 
Boards for the Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice and 
Behavior and a fellow of the Canadian Psychological Association.  He has had 
many publications in the areas of risk assessment and offender rehabilitation, such 
as The Psychology of Criminal Conduct, co-authored with D. A. Andrews and The 
Level of Service Inventory–Revised, an offender risk-need classification instrument 
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shares Judge Warren’s belief that courts using risk assessment in 
sentencing must avoid outcomes based only on an offender’s risk to 
reoffend.  Rather, Bonta believes sentences “must be proportional 
to the offence [sic].”228  The LSI-R’s value is “the reliable and valid 
identification of criminogenic needs,” Bonta writes, and the 
consequent ability to craft a sentence that effectively addresses the 
offender’s risk of recidivism.229  Dr. Bonta describes a continuum of 
evidence-based sentencing practices in Canada involving use of 
recidivism risk assessments in pre-sentence reports, explaining that 
some provinces “write their [pre-sentence reports] around the LSI 
in a narrative form,” evaluating criminogenic factors, but revealing 
to the sentencing judge neither the LSI-R score nor the ultimate 
classification of low/medium/high risk to reoffend.230  However, 
practice in other provinces is one of fuller transparency, with all 
risk assessment information made available to the sentencing 
judge.231  
The State of Missouri takes evidence-based sentencing a step 
further.  In 2004, when the Missouri Sentencing Advisory 
Commission began the process of retooling the state’s sentencing 
policies, it backed away from a determinate guidelines-based 
sentencing approach.232  According to Missouri Supreme Court 
Justice Michael Wolff, “unlike sentencing commissions in other 
states, we instead set out not to restrict judicial discretion but to 
better inform its exercise.”233  Judicial discretion is 
“enhance[ed] . . . with data that can shape the correct placement 
of offenders,” Justice Wolff writes, which does not mean that 
“judges get to do whatever they like.”234  Rather, the approach 
should be called “evidence-based sentencing, for that is what it is: 
sentences by judges who have considered the evidence that informs 
 
that has been translated into five languages and is used by correctional systems in 
many countries.”). 
 228. E-mail from James Bonta, Dir. of Corr. Research, Pub. Safety & 
Emergency Preparedness Canada, to Robert Sykora, Minn. Attorney and Chief 
Info. Officer for Minn. Bd. of Pub. Def. (Aug. 8, 2010) (on file with author Robert 
Sykora).  
 229. Id.  
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Michael A. Wolff, Evidence-Based Judicial Discretion: Promoting Public Safety 
Through State Sentencing Reform, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1389 (2008). 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 1404–05 (emphasis added). 
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their discretion.”235 
Yet even the Missouri model of smart sentencing seems to use 
evidence only as an ancillary source of information for the 
sentencing judge, not as the driving factor.  The Indiana Supreme 
Court explicitly created such a limitation for its courts in the first 
published state supreme court decision dealing with evidence-
based sentencing.  The court ruled in Malenchik v. Indiana that the 
LSI-R and other such evaluative data are acceptable when used to 
“inform” a trial court’s sentencing determinations in a manner 
“supplemental to other sentencing evidence that independently 
support[s] the sentence imposed.”236 
When forming public policy to respond to crime, there are no 
silver bullets.  It is an ever-evolving science.  Like any effort to 
quantify human behavior and predict the future, the process of 
implementing EBPs has inherent flaws.  The problems may result 
from training inconsistencies, cultural gaps, possible gender-based 
norming problems, and even regional differences in test responses, 
as detailed below: 
1.Training variance.  Though the standardized 
assessment tools themselves remain static—for 
example, the LSI-R has fifty-four standard questions 
asked of everyone—training of people administering 
the assessment inevitably varies, and individual 
variations surely introduce imprecision.237 
2.Culture.  Study of the LSI-R when used with 
Native American populations, for example, suggests 
that the predictive validity is low when used with those 
populations and that further research with this 
subgroup is needed. 
3.Gender.  Recent research from the University of 
Cincinnati suggests that predicting recidivism by 
women might be better accomplished with an 
actuarial tool normed solely with populations of 




 235. Id.  
 236. Malenchik v. Indiana, 928 N.E.2d 564, 566 (Ind. 2010). 
 237. A sample LSI-R report showing the fifty-four questions is available from its 
publisher at http://downloads.mhs.com/lsir/lsi-r-5-profile.pdf.  
 238. ADVISORY TASK FORCE ON THE WOMAN & JUVENILE FEMALE OFFENDER IN 
CORRS., GENDER-RESPONSIVE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE LS/CMI  1 (2010). 
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4.Region.  The many studies used to validate the 
LSI-R have produced a variety of results.  For example, 
an Iowa study found the tool a “valid and valuable” 
predictor of recidivism,239 while a study in Pennsylvania 
found only a weak correlation with certain types of 
offenders.240 
LSI-R author James Bonta argues that, despite these 
imprecisions, assessment tools have a track record superior to 
hunch and instinct.  He writes: “I agree that risks/needs 
instruments are not perfect, but they are preferable to relying on 
intuition and professional judgment.”241  Evidence has a better track 
record than intuition.  We owe it to the families affected by 
corrections and the society that pays its enormous cost to pursue 
the solutions that the evidence incontrovertibly shows to be 
effective. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The vast majority of humankind does not need the threat of 
prison to motivate good behavior.  Conscience and compassion 
work for most of us; promise of hellfire and damnation work for 
almost all the rest.  A few need the threat of imprisonment to 
remain on the straight and narrow path.  Even fewer—currently 
9234 individuals, just under two-tenths of one percent of the 
Minnesota population—we choose to incarcerate at enormous 
cost.242  How best can we ensure that our State’s decreasing 
resources are expended in a way that reduces crime?  
The best start to re-shaping felony sentencing in Minnesota is 
to establish recidivism reduction as an explicit goal of state 
sentencing policy by both the Sentencing Guidelines Commission 
 
 239. Lowenkamp & Bechtel, supra note 124. 
 240. See JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., THE INST. ON CRIME JUSTICE & CORR. AT THE GEORGE 
WASHINGTON UNIV., RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY STUDY OF THE LSI-R RISK ASSESSMENT 
INSTRUMENT: FINAL REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND 
PAROLE 22 (2003) (finding that the LSI-R “is best suited for institutional case 
planning upon admission to prison and to determine the level of community 
supervision required once parole has been granted”); see also WASH. STATE INST. FOR 
PUB. POLICY, SEX OFFENDER SENTENCING IN WASHINGTON STATE: PREDICTING 
RECIDIVISM BASED ON THE LSI-R (2006), available at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov
/rptfiles/06-02-1201.pdf (“[T]he LSI-R score predicts felony sex recidivism with 
weak accuracy.”). 
 241. Bonta, supra note 205, at 522. 
 242. See Daily Adult Inmate Profile Reports, MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., 
http://www.doc.state.mn.us/aboutdoc/stats/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2010). 
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and the Minnesota Legislature and to recommit to the values the 
Guidelines began with: consistency, proportionality, and 
economy.243  Underlying these ideals is a valuable belief about 
process, that an independent, diverse, broadly experienced group 
of Minnesotans working together—outside electoral politics—has 
the ability to change criminal justice for the better.  
In the 1960s, the Criminal Code was put together by such a 
group.  In the 1970s, the same kind of collaboration created the 
Rules of Criminal Procedure.  In 1980, the Guidelines began to 
operate, as we have seen, with many creators and much support.  In 
the 1990s, a similar group from all over the geographical and 
professional bi-partisan map created juvenile blended sentencing, 
which has been a national model. 
Since then, Minnesota’s ability to collaborate on criminal 
justice on a big-picture level has sputtered.  The Non-Felony 
Enforcement Advisory Committee did an enormous amount of 
work on misdemeanor reform, which got nowhere.244  The drug 
court movement took hold here five years ago (well behind many 
other states), but has managed to spread to less than half the 
counties, and remains an excellent, but small-scale option, 
considering the magnitude of the criminal law problem caused by 
drug and alcohol abuse.245 
If a multi-professional, broad-based group were to take on 
felony sentencing, what could it accomplish?  How about: 
Revise the Criminal Code and the Guidelines so that 
differences of degree of offense are linked to different sentencing 
options, and so that the old priority of using prisons for 
perpetrators of violent crimes predominates again. 
Provide long but indeterminate sentences for sex offenses, 
with an independent release board equipped with evidence-based 
offender evaluations to make release decisions based on risk.  
Essentially the presumed Guidelines sentences for these offenders 
 
 243. See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, PUB. SAFETY PERFORMANCE PROJECT, ARMING THE 
COURTS WITH RESEARCH: 10 EVIDENCE-BASED SENTENCING INITIATIVES TO CONTROL CRIME 
AND REDUCE COSTS 4–5 (2009), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org
/uploadedFiles/Final_EBS_Brief.pdf. 
 244. ACCESS & SERVICE DELIVERY COMM., REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA JUDICIAL 
COUNCIL 10 (2008), available at http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/0/Public
/Court_Information_Office/ASD_Report.doc.  
 245. See Drug Courts, MINN. JUDICIAL BRANCH, http://www.mncourts.gov
/?page=1800 (last visited Jan. 4, 2011) (listing operational drug courts in 
Minnesota by county). 
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would be “indeterminate sentences.”  Among other benefits, this 
approach would obviate constant tinkering with “patterned” and 
“predatory” and “dangerous” sentence extenders, and would save 
much of the cost of keeping past offenders who have served their 
sentences in secure hospitals because state officials are scared to let 
them out.246 
Use evidence-based practices in setting conditions of 
probation for the many thousands of felons whose presumed 
sentence is not state prison.  This way the first question would be, 
“what would work to prevent this person from committing more 
crimes?” 
Sentence most drug and alcohol offenders—not the large-scale 
dealers, dealers with guns, dealers who sell to kids—to a presumed 
sentence of drug court, which operates under a plan that includes 
evaluating itself. 
This last feature, self-evaluation, is critical.  Self-evaluation is 
hard to do in an atmosphere where any major crime is an occasion 
to blame the policy-makers, blame the judges, or blame the 
governor who appointed them; but it is the only way criminal 
justice will get better, as it needs to do. 
We have seen great change since 1978.  Disco is dead.  
Gasoline is not cheap.  “Just deserts” sentencing policy is costly and 
often ineffective.  Over the history of our state we have seen 
criminal justice based on the death penalty evolve to criminal 
justice based on prison, and then change to be based on probation 
and parole, and then “just deserts” and the Guidelines.  
Fortunately, Minnesota has had people working on new solutions 
throughout the Guidelines era: EBP developers, drug court 
pioneers, and sex offender evaluators.  This article is an invitation 
to see what we can take from their efforts to move toward the next 
stage of building an affordable criminal justice system that works. 
 
 
 246. See supra Part V.B. 
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